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et al.: Practice and Procedure--Judgements--Supervision by Court Over Ord
WEST VIBGINIA LAW QUABTEBLY

instead that "the tortious act itself-the act in the manner in
which it was done"--be within the scope of the partnership business. Thus, it has been said that committing illegal acts cannot be
"within the scope of the partnership, which could only exist for
lawful purposes," Hutchins v. Turner, 8 Hump. 414, 417 (Tenn.
1847), that partners "are not answerable for the wrongs of each
other"'even though done in the course of the partnership business,
Rosenkranz v. Barker, 115 Ill. 331, 3 N. E. 93, 96 (1885), and
that committing a tort is not "within the power constructively delegated to one partner as the agent of the other." Farrellv. Friedlander, 63 Hun 254, 18 N. Y. Supp. 215 (1892). Since such cases
also hold that there is no legal presumption that one partner concurs in the wrongful acts of another, Taylor v. Jones, 42 N. H.
25, 37 (1860), it follows that they require express authorization
or ratification of the tort to impose liability. Since the liability of
one partner for the tort of his copartner is governed by the same
principles as the liability of a master for the tort of his servant or
a corporation for the tort of its agent, Marshall v. Anderson, 92 S.
E. 421 (W. Va. 1917); Linton v. Hurley, 14 Gray 191 (Mass.
1859), it would seem that cases opposed to the principal case
would not be followed should this question arise in West Virginia.
This seems clearly deducible from West Virginia cases holding a
master liable for the tort of his servant "done in the course of the
principal's business, though unauthorized or forbidden," McDonald v. Cole, 46 W. Va. 186, 188, 32 S. E. 1033 (1899), and even
though the act was wilful and malicious. Bess v. Railway Co., 35
W. Va. 492, 496, 14 S. E. 234 (1891) ; Gillingham v. Railroad Co.,
35 W. Va. 588, 14 S. E. 243, 14 L. R. A. 798 (1891); Gregory,
Adm'r. v. Railroad Co., 37 W. Va. 606, 16 S.E. 819 (1893) ; Hall
v. Norfolk & W. R. Co., 44 W. Va. 36, 37, 28 S.E. 754, 41 L. R. A.
669, 67 Am. St. Rep. 757 (1897). These cases are clearly based
-onthe test as to whether the service in which the tortious act was
done-rather than the act itself-was incident to the employment.
The holding of the principal case that the test of liability is
-whether the tortious act was such that, if it had been done in a
non-tortious manner, the service would have been within the ordinary course of the partnership business, and within the real or
apparent scope of the partner's authority, is clearly correct on
principle and in accord with the trend of analogous authority in
West Virginia.
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RuIs.--In a suit in equity, one
of the defendants died on the rule day on which a decree pro confesso was entered at rules and the cause set for hearing. Argued,
that the entries at rules were void on account of the death of the
defendant and that the court had no authority to award a scire
facias on motion, because the suit was not properly on the hearing
docket. Held, that the court, having authority to enter any such
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order as the clerk should have entered at rules, had authority to
award the scire facias regardless of the validity or invalidity of
entries at rules. Moore v. Moore, 93 S. E. 937 (W. Va. 1917).
By virtue of c. 125, § 60, WEST VIRGINIA CoDE, "the court shall
have control over all proceedings in the office during the preceding
vacation. It may reinstate any cause discontinued during such
vacation, set aside any of the proceedings or correct any mistake
therein, and make such order concerning the same as may be just."
The language of the statute would seem to give the court absolute
control over proceedings at rules, with power to revoke, amend,
supply, or substitute all orders in such proceedings without limitation. lnevertheless, former decisions have restricted the application of the statute. It has been held that "a defendant takes notice
-of these rule-day entries, and relies upon them. If none is made,
he has a right to rest upon the knowledge that the cause is not being prosecuted against him to a hearing at which he must respond." McDerrnittv. Newman, 64 W. Va. 195, 199, 61 S. E. 300
(1908). The same rule had already been announced in Gallatin
Land, Coal and Oil Co. v. Davis, 44 W. Va. 109, 119, 28 S. E. 747
(1897), where it is held that a cause should be remanded to rules
for the purpose of supplying omitted orders. In Darnell v. Flynn,
69 W. Va. 146, 149, 71 S. E. 16 (1911), it was held that "the
taking of the rules is purely a ministerial, not a judicial act." This
case opened the way for the modern rule, clearly opposed to the
old rule and which is finally and definitely established in Sayre
v. McIntosh, 92 S. E. 443 (W. Va. 1917). In the latter case, the
West Virginia court adopts the Southeastern Reporter's syllabus
point 2, prefixed to the opinion of the Virginia court in SouThern
Express Co. v. Jacobs, 109 Va. 27, 63 S. E. 17 (1908), as laying
down the rule now recognized: "Where plaintiff had done all
that was required to entitle him to his office judgment, he could
not be prejudiced by the failure of the clerk to enter the rules
properly as required by statute." The principal case is merely
the latest enunciation of the same principle. It seems that orders
at rules are now recognized as, in effect, coming in esse and operating automatically. In such a view, the court is essentiallly entering a nunc pro tune order, which comes into being automatically
and the mere entry of which was omitted by the clerk. But it is
not necessary to base the supervisory authority of the court upon
the nunc pro tunc principle, because the statute itself expressly
gives such authority. The modern rule is entirely in harmony
with the letter and spirit of the statute. WEST VnGINIA CODE, c.
125, ; '
A defendant is bound to know what orders should be
.ed at rules. Hence, the actual entry gives him no additional
notice. He in no instance can object to the entry of a proper order
at rules, whether he has had notice of its entry or not, and if an
improper order has been entered against him, the very same supervisory power of the court may be invoked in his favor.
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